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Abstract
The power to use force is a defining characteristic of policing, one that is accompanied by a
responsibility to exercise these powers in the circumstances deemed necessary. This study
analyzes data from four policing agencies to predict the likelihood of an officer drawing and
pointing their firearm at a use of force incident. Findings suggest that situational factors were
important in influencing whether an officer may draw and point their firearm. However, a
priming effect, in which officers were more likely to draw their firearms when dispatched to an
incident, may also be present. The rate that officers drew and pointed their firearms varied
between jurisdictions, as did the nature of the incidents. Caution should be exercised in
generalizing the results of single-site studies on police use of force, or introducing research into
policy beyond the jurisdiction in which it was performed.
Keywords: use of force, firearms, firearm display, priming, external validity
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Understanding the circumstances that give rise to police use of force (UOF) is paramount,
as is understanding the tactical decisions officers make during UOF incidents. Fortunately,
American policing in the 21st Century is much better at tracking uses of force and being transparent
with the resulting data than in the past (Garner et al., 2018; Pate & Fridell, 1995; Shjarback, 2019).
The push for more “community-oriented” policing, the diffusion of the Internet, and in some cases,
federal consent decrees have encouraged agencies to post incident-level UOF data to their
websites, where researchers are free to download and test their hypotheses (see e.g., Chanin &
Courts, 2017; Matusiak et al., 2022; Rosenbaum et al., 2011). These, alongside increased interest
in police UOF after Michael Brown was killed in Ferguson (President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, 2015), have led to an explosion of research on the topic in the last decade.
Police are authorized to use the amount of force necessary to compel compliance or to
defend themselves. This is in fact the defining characteristic of the police function (Bittner, 1970).
Consequently, the public expects agencies to document when officers exercise this authority.
Unfortunately, use of force definitions vary considerably across states and local jurisdictions, as
do the behaviors considered a “reportable” use of force (Stoughton et al., 2020). For instance,
according to the most recent estimates, only 54% of all local agencies require officers to document
when they point their firearms at people (Brooks, 2020). While pointing a firearm is a UOF, it
stands apart from other tactics (e.g., control techniques, TASERs, OC spray) because officers are
neither trained nor expected to point their firearms to compel compliance or prevent suspects from
fleeing. Instead, firearms are to be drawn when officers reasonably believe they might need to
discharge them to respond to or prevent an imminent, deadly attack.1

For example, the Los Angeles Police Department’s policy (revised June 29, 2020) states: “Officers shall not draw
or exhibit a firearm unless the circumstances surrounding the incident create a reasonable belief that it may be
necessary to use the firearm. When an officer has determined that the use of deadly force is not necessary, the
1
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Decades of research and dozens of studies have examined the correlates and causes of UOF
in a general sense (Bolger, 2015), as well as specific types of force such as the TASER (Bishopp
& Klinger, 2015; White & Ready, 2007) or OC spray (Kaminski et al., 1998; Smith & Alpert,
2000). This scholarship suggests that various situational, environmental, suspect, and officer
characteristics may influence the likelihood of police using force. However, far less is known about
the circumstances that give rise to when officers point but don’t shoot their firearms. For example,
officers’ preoccupation with danger (Skolnick, 1966; Sierra-Arévalo, 2021) might make them
more prone to draw and point their firearms when performing certain activities (e.g., serving
warrants, making arrests) or being dispatched to certain calls for service (e.g., domestic disputes;
see Nix et al., 2021). Meanwhile, the science of implicit biases and stereotype threats raises
concerns that a suspect’s race may influence officers’ decisions to draw and point their firearms
(James et al., 2016; Kahn et al., 2016; Smith & Alpert, 2007; Trinkner et al., 2019). And finally,
the “policing as a craft” argument (Bayley & Bittner, 1984) suggests that with experience, officers
become more adept at dealing with people and resolving conflicts without relying on coercion
(Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Paoline & Terrill, 2007). Thus, inexperienced officers might be more
likely to draw and point their firearms than those with more years on the job.
Comparatively less empirical attention has been given to the factors influencing officers’
decisions to draw and point their firearms, but the studies we do have focus primarily on suspect
and officer characteristics, such as race (Stansfield et al., 2021; Ridell & Worrall, 2021; Worrall
et al., 2021) or the decision to pull the trigger once the firearm has been drawn (Wheeler et al.,
2017; Worrall et al., 2018). Two studies also suggest that requiring officers to report when they

officer shall, as soon as practicable, secure or holster the firearm…Moreover, any intentional pointing of a firearm at
a person by an officer shall be reported.” See “Drawing or Exhibiting Firearms” at
https://www.lapdonline.org/newsroom/policy-on-the-use-of-force-revised/.
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display their firearms is associated with a reduction in police shooting rates (Jennings & Rubado,
2017; Shjarback et al., 2021).
One thing clear from these studies is that officers frequently draw and point but don’t shoot
their firearms. For example, in New Orleans between 2016 and 2019, Riddell & Worrall (2021)
found that officers pointed their firearms during 2,116 “response to resistance” incidents – 50% of
the total (N=4243). In comparison, officers pointed their conducted energy weapon (CEW) in only
5% of such incidents. However, less than 1% of officers who pointed their firearms ultimately
discharged them; meanwhile, 44% of those who pointed their CEW ultimately discharged them.
In a separate study, Wheeler et al. (2017) found that Dallas police officers were involved in 207
shootings over a 14-year period (~15 per year on average) compared to 1,702 incidents where they
pointed their guns but did not shoot in the first 4 years after a reporting requirement was instituted
(~425 per year on average). This suggests Dallas cops pulled the trigger upon drawing and pointing
their firearms about 3% of the time. Granted, these are just two departments among thousands, but
for every 100 times officers in these agencies draw and point their guns, they ultimately do not
pull the trigger somewhere between 97 and 99 times. This suggests there may be a glaring hole in
our collective knowledge with respect to police use of deadly force – and in particular,
understanding the factors associated with officers’ restraint in the use of deadly force.2Another
thing clear from emerging scholarship is that studies usually focus on single agencies. Yet, it is
well-established that agencies differ in terms of their organizational culture (Chan, 1996; Wilson,
1967). Furthermore, studies consistently reveal that administrative policies vary across

2

For exceptions, see a series of simulated experiments by Lois James and colleagues (James et al., 2013, 2014,
2016, 2018a, 2018b). See also Fryer (2019). To better understand the factors associated with police shootings in
Houston, Fryer compiled a random sample of arrest codes “in which lethal force is more likely to be justified:
attempted capital murder of a public safety officer, aggravated assault on a public safety officer, resisting arrest,
evading arrest, and interfering in an arrest” (p. 1213). This sample is assumed by the author to reflect reasonably the
universe of incidents wherein officers exercised restraint in using deadly force.
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organizations, and significantly influence officer decision-making in the field (Fyfe, 1988; Terrill
& Paoline, 2017; White, 2001). In their study of three police departments, Terrill and Paoline
(2017) demonstrated “that officers working within the most restrictive policy framework used
force less readily than officers who operated within more permissive policy environments” (p.
193). In a separate analysis of use of force behaviors among officers in six departments, Paoline
et al. (2021) documented a great deal of variation in use of force rates – irrespective of the
benchmark used (contacts, arrests, or Part I crimes). And here again, agencies with more restrictive
UOF policies exhibited lower UOF rates. Thus, there is good reason to expect significant variation
across agencies in the rate at which officers draw and point their firearms.
The purpose of our study is to shed additional light on the factors associated with officers’
decisions to draw and point their firearms. To do so, we build on the existing literature by
compiling open-source data from four urban police departments – Austin (Texas), Baltimore
(Maryland), Dallas (Texas), and Portland (Oregon) – and use machine learning techniques,
alongside more traditional statistical modelling, to predict the likelihood of any UOF incident
involving an officer drawing and pointing their firearm. The use of multiple agencies’ data is a
contribution in and of itself, as most prior work on this topic has been focused on a single
department (often Dallas). We note that, to our knowledge, no published study has analyzed data
from Austin, Baltimore, or Portland. Likewise, our use of machine learning techniques makes a
methodological contribution to the police UOF literature. Before we elaborate on our data and
methods, we briefly discuss the use of machine learning in policing.
Machine Learning in Policing
Machine learning analytics may be better matched to the complexity of the decisionmaking processes reflected in criminal justice data, and complexity of data ensemble in
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administrative data, than generalized linear modelling (Brennan & Oliver, 2013). Although
machine learning techniques have been used to predict criminal offending, and even rare violent
events, with reasonable success (Berk, 2017; Berk et al., 2016; Berk & Sorenson, 2020), there have
been very few applications to police behavior. Emerging literature proposes that machine learning
is a powerful tool for developing risk assessments (Berk, 2021), but it remains that stratifying
behavior for analysis provides considerable insight into those specific behaviors. In this case,
prediction of drawing and pointing firearms may contribute another important part of the deadly
force story.
Machine learning analytics have been used in recent years to interrogate policing data with
considerable accuracy (Berk et al., 2009; Berk et al., 2016; Cubitt et al., 2020). For example,
analytical processes of this type have been used to forecast domestic violence (Berk, 2019; Berk
et al., 2016; Grogger et al., 2021) and high-harm offense types (Berk et al., 2009; Cubitt & Morgan,
2022). Machine learning, while remaining an underutilized analytical methodology in the field of
policing, offers a viable alternative to generalized linear modelling, by allowing data to be
interrogated with greater granularity.
While this remains an emerging analytical approach, there are some concerns relating
development of prediction models, including the importance of data quality, and the need to be
discerning in training models (Bennett Moses & Chan, 2018). Importantly, ethical and
jurisprudential concerns have been identified (Berk et al., 2018; Coglianese & Lehr, 2017), largely
centering on the suggestion of mindfulness regarding the decisions computed by these models,
particularly in complex systems like criminal justice. However, these techniques have proliferated
in recent years and are increasingly applied to policing data, often outperforming traditional
analytics (Couronné et al., 2018; Grogger et al., 2021). While transparency in the decisions
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computed by these models is essential (McKay, 2019), the primary risks associated with machine
learning approaches and applications appear to be misclassification of individuals and blind
adherence to computed models (Ridgeway, 2013), although the implementation process also bears
consideration. Regardless of the quality of the data, or strength of the modelling processes, poor
implementation strategies may undermine the analytics, a factor which requires consideration in
any analytical technique (Stevenson & Doleac, 2021).
The Present Study
An array of literature considers UOF (Bolger, 2015), and there is considerable research focused
on the UOF involving firearms (Nix et al., 2017; Nix & Shjarback, 2021; VerBruggen, 2022).
Comparatively less research considers the factors associated with officers drawing and pointing
their firearms, but not subsequently discharging them (Ridell & Worrall, 2021; Wheeler et al.,
2017; Worrall et al., 2018, 2021). This is a serious use of police authority, and may offer notable
insight into the behavior of officers at UOF incidents. As a result, in undertaking this analysis we
intend to answer two key questions:
1. Is it possible to predict which use of force incidents will feature a patrol officer drawing
and pointing, but not discharging their firearm?
2. What are the contributory factors to patrol officers drawing and pointing, but not
discharging their firearms at use of force events among these data?
Data Description
As a feature of operational procedures, and intending to improve transparency in policing,
departments frequently collect and publish data relating to UOF incidents. These data consist of a
range of features, commonly including the reason provided by officers for the UOF, their
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assignment, the service type undertaken at the time that force was used, whether an arrest was
made, whether an offense occurred and the offense type, whether an officer was injured and
severity of the injury, demographics of the individual subjected to UOF, and certain demographics
of the officer involved. Pivotally, some police departments (PD) make the types of force used by
officers available among their data. To improve the validity and generalizability of findings, it was
important to consider more than one PD. In light of prior work documenting organizational
differences in police culture (Chan, 1996; Wilson, 1967) and the effects of administrative policies
on UOF behaviors (Fyfe, 1988; Terrill & Paoline, 2017; White, 2001), focusing on a single
jurisdiction may provide insight relative to the jurisdiction itself, while limiting the generalized
insight in relation to UOF incidents,
The selection of PDs for analysis revealed important features of UOF reporting, and
important barriers to the analysis of these data. It was immediately evident that PDs did not
commonly report the same set of information, and when they did, it was often structured differently
between jurisdictions. As a result, this research required data reported through similar channels
(open data portals), from PDs that featured similar reporting protocols. Four PDs were selected,
and while these departments reported an array of data, there were several essential variables that
were available for each jurisdiction. This research therefore considers only the variables that were
consistent between these four PDs, and their contribution to the likelihood that a patrol officer may
draw and point their firearm as a means of control at a UOF event.
Data were obtained for the Austin PD (City of Austin Open Data Portal, 2022), Baltimore
PD (Project Comport, 2019), Dallas PD (Dallas Open Data, 2022), and the Portland Police Bureau
(Portland Police Bureau, 2022). Prior to aggregating and analyzing these data, the policy
documents for the use of force in each agency were reviewed to consider (1) whether pointing a
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firearm was considered a use of force, and (2) whether reporting requirements were similar
between agencies (see Austin PD (2020); Baltimore PD (2019a; 2019b); Dallas PD (2021);
Portland PB (2020)). Use of force policy in each of these agencies was markedly similar, while
there were only marginal differences in reporting requirements, primarily relating to officers that
observed the use of force. Drawing and pointing firearms was considered reasonable in each
agency when an objective and reasonable threat that may escalate to require deadly force was
identified. However, each agency considered the drawing and pointing of a firearm alone as a
serious use of force. Further, in each agency, warning shots were explicitly prohibited, meaning
there was a clear distinction between the reporting on drawing and pointing a firearm at a citizen
as a use of force, and discharging a firearm.
All four agencies required the officer that drew and pointed their firearm to formally report
their use of force. However, policy in Portland PB and Baltimore PD also required all officers that
observed a use of force to submit an independent report. Austin PD required observing officers to
make a supplemental report to the primary reporting officer that drew and pointed their firearm,
while Dallas PD broadly stated that any use of force above a certain threshold, that includes
drawing and pointing a firearm, must be reported. Notably, the Baltimore and Dallas PDs
suggested that where firearms were drawn while entering a building during the service of a warrant,
without being pointed in response to a specific threat, these need not be reported as a use of force.
Given that these jurisdictions featured markedly similar use of force and reporting policies,
data from each jurisdiction were aggregated for an overlapping three-year period, from 1st January
2017 to 31 December 2019. Each agency featured substantial data relating to UOF incidents during
this three-year period, with Austin reporting 11,703, Baltimore reporting 14,464, Dallas reporting
8,367, and Portland reporting 4,079 UOF incidents. Importantly, there were variables reflecting
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the same content reported among each jurisdiction. These included the motivation for the UOF as
reported by officers, the service type that officers were engaged in at the time of using force, the
length of service of the officer (tenure), whether the incident involved an arrest, whether an officer
was injured during the incident, the race of the citizen, and the gender of the citizen.
However, among these data, there were varying degrees of missingness. Relating to
variables considered here, data from Austin featured 991 records with missing data (8.5%), while
Baltimore featured 1,855 (12.8%), Dallas featured 643 (7.7%), and Portland only featured 36
(0.9%). Riddell & Worrall (2021), in considering UOF incidents in New Orleans, identified that
records were commonly duplicated at UOF incidents in which officers drew their firearms. To
account for this, we flagged any records that featured the same date, time, and officer identification
number as duplicates. This resulted in the identification of 405 duplicate records in Austin, 4,990
in Baltimore, 459 in Dallas, and 6 in Portland that were removed from the analysis. After removing
missing and duplicate records we retained 10,307 records from Austin PD, 7,589 from Baltimore
PD, 7,265 from Dallas PD, and 4,033 records from Portland Police Bureau that described UOF
incidents between the January of 2017, and December of 2019.
This research sought to consider whether, using these variables, it was possible to predict
whether patrol officers would draw and point their firearm at an interaction that featured the UOF.
Patrol officers were selected based on their duties at the time of the use of force. In particular, we
sought to understand which variables, and which features within those variables were most
contributory to the likelihood of officers drawing and pointing their firearms as a means of control.
We restricted our analysis to patrol officers due to the variety of interactions they have, in
opposition to specialist officers for whom drawing firearms may be a function of their specialist
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duties3. For example, an officer attached to a tactical response unit may draw their firearm at every
call out, where a fraud investigator may draw their firearm at very few if any incidents, meaning
the duty type variable likely explains the vast majority of variance in incidents at which these
officers draw their firearm. Subsequently, this research sets aside specialist officers to focus on the
decisions of patrol officers.
Methodology
Analytical Procedure
It was first important to compare the available data between each jurisdiction. Summary
statistics were provided for each common variable between agencies and a simple correlation
analysis was then undertaken. Correlation is important prior to modelling, primarily to rule out
collinearity. Although bootstrap aggregation of the random forest typically means the influence
of collinear variables is limited, individual feature importance may be artificially inflated (Cubitt
et al., 2020). These variables featured a heterogeneous structure, and as such required a
heterogeneous correlation matrix (McGrath & Meyer, 2006). Because the data featured a mix of
binary, categorical and continuous variables, the correlation matrix produced here employed a
mix of tetrachoric (Brown & Benedetti, 1977), polychoric (Brown, 2006; Babchishin & Helmus,
2016), and Pearson correlations (Holgado-Tello et al., 2010; Babchishin & Helmus, 2016).
Random Forest and Logistic Regression
The volume of data considered was substantial, and the behaviors described by these data
were complex. Accordingly, a machine learning analysis was employed. Machine learning

3

Random forest modelling including specialist officers was undertaken separately. Model accuracy was particularly
high (AUROC = 0.9355), with the increased model accuracy largely attributable to tactical response units drawing
and pointing firearms in response to citizens that refused to comply.
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analytics are particularly useful in discerning non-linear interactions between variables (Berk,
2013), a common feature among data emerging from complex behavioral decisions. As a result,
the random forest algorithm was implemented. A key aspect of the random forest is its
transparency, allowing for insight into the most contributory features of the modelling, including
where effect size fluctuated within the range of covariates. The random forest has been
consistently found to outperform generalized linear modelling, such as logistic regression
(Couronné et al, 2018), however it is still considered to be an emerging methodology, and as
such it is important to benchmark against logistic regression to ensure the more accurate model is
employed. Logistic regression is a common feature of classification exercises using policing data
(Kane & White, 2009; Gaub, 2020), and has also been established as a strong comparator for
considering the efficacy of the random forest (Cubitt et al., 2020).
To compute the random forest, data were randomized and partitioned into a 70% training
set and a 30% test set. The random forest algorithm was trained on the larger set, with the model
tested using the partitioned test set (Hyndman & Anthanasopoulos, 2014). Modelling was
performed through application of preprocess design matrices, with analysis undertaken using the
statistical analysis software, R version 4.2.0, and the ‘randomForest’, ‘dplyr’, ‘pROC’, ‘pdp’,
‘PerformanceAnalytics’, and ‘ggplot2’ packages. The initial model was trained on the binary
variable representing the decision by officers to draw and point, but not discharge their firearm at
a UOF incident. The model was then tested against the partitioned test set, to identify the
effectiveness of the classification model developed. A logistic regression was then estimated
employing the same data structure, undertaking the same classification task.
A Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve was employed to identify the accuracy
of each random forest and logistic regression, through the Area Under the Receiver Operating
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Characteristic (AUROC) curve. The ROC curve identifies the true positive rate of classification
(y-axis), compared with the false positive rate (x-axis) at any threshold value. The AUROC,
which we refer to in simple terms as the accuracy of the model, represents the probability that a
randomly selected case will be accurately classified.
To find the most robust modelling approach, we tune the hyperparameters of the random
forest model to optimize the number of iterations, and variables randomly considered at each split.
We then report the out-of-bag error estimate, which describes the aggregate error of the random
forest on the training set (Schonlau & Zou, 2020). The random forest performs a type of cross
validation, using out-of-bag samples, as a component of the training step of the modelling process.
We therefore report the out-of-bag error estimate, alongside the confusion matrix for prediction
error on the test set, and the AUROC, to describe accuracy of the modelling processes (Svetnik et
al, 2003; Couronné et al., 2018; Schonlau & Zou, 2020).
To support decisions regarding modelling, we then consider whether the difference
between the area under the ROC curve for each model was statistically significant. To do this, we
implement the bootstrap test for statistical significance between Receiver Operating Characteristic
curves.
The results of each random forest model were interpreted through Mean Decrease Gini
(MDG) (Hong et al., 2016). The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion, in which
results attributed to variables are interpreted as a proportion of the overall random forest model,
relative to the AUROC produced by ROC curve. In simple terms, the AUROC identifies the
accuracy of the model, while the variables are attributed an MDG coefficient identifying their
importance in the accuracy of those predictions. To supplement these analyses, a confusion
matrix was produced for the test set of each model. The confusion matrix measures the
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performance of the trained model on the test set, providing a measure of how often the model
successfully or unsuccessfully made predictions (Barnes & Hyatt, 2012).
Partial Dependence
A post-hoc analysis was undertaken of covariates that the random forest indicated as
having a noteworthy interaction with the likelihood of patrol officers drawing and pointing their
firearms. Partial Dependence Plots (PDP) were employed to consider the nature of the
relationship between covariates in these models and the outcome variable. Functionally, PDPs
provide the logit contribution of a given variable to the probability of classification to the
dependent variable, at different points within the range of that variable, relative to the Gini
coefficient emerging from the random forest. Put simply, PDPs show the association of
individual variables with the outcome variable, at different points within the range of those
variables.
PDPs have been used in the analysis of policing data, relating to domestic violence
(Grogger et al., 2021), police misconduct (Cubitt., 2020; Cubitt & Birch, 2021) and high harm
offending by outlaw motorcycle gang members (Cubitt & Morgan, 2022). In each of these
analyses, PDPs were employed to consider the direct relationship between single features, and
the outcome variable. However, PDPs may also be used to consider the interaction effect of any
given number of variables, to assess their joint impact on the outcome variable. An interaction
effect refers to the simultaneous effect of two or more independent variables on a dependent
variable, in which their joint effect is different, greater or lesser, than the sum of their parts
(Lavrakas, 2008). Applying this approach is important, and novel to this area of study, as it helps
provide greater insight, in this circumstance, into the correlates of drawing firearms under
different conditions.
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Applying an interaction effect approach to joint variables is a common approach in
biomedical research (Kang et al., 2021). However, this approach has not previously been applied
as a post-hoc analysis to elucidate interactions resulting from a machine learning analysis in
policing, or policing literature. Here, we apply this approach to measure the joint effect of
several key variables on the likelihood of a patrol officer drawing and pointing their firearm.
Results
Summary Statistics and Correlation
There were 29,240 UOF incidents in these jurisdictions for consideration between the 1st
of January 2017 and the 31st of December 2019. There was some variance in the rate of drawing
firearms at UOF incidents between agencies, with Dallas featuring the highest rate, and Austin
the lowest. Table 1 suggests that officers most commonly used force when responding to
incidents that they observed, or to which they were called out. However, it was notable that
officers in Baltimore more commonly used force when serving a warrant than other jurisdictions,
while officers in Dallas featured an elevated rate of responding to incidents, and using force,
while off duty. The reported motivation for the UOF varied between jurisdictions. In Austin and
Dallas, the predominant motivation was to make an arrest, while in Baltimore and Portland, it
was where a citizen did not comply with directions issued by an officer. Importantly, with the
exception of Austin, a notable proportion of officers reported self-defense, or the defense of
others as a motivation for UOF.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Not all instances of UOF involved attempting an arrest, and not all instances in which
officers were motivated by making an arrest, resulted in an arrest. Dallas reported a higher rate of
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arrests at UOF incidents than other jurisdictions, but overall, the majority of UOF incidents
featured an arrest. Force was most commonly used against male citizens. In two jurisdictions,
officers most commonly used force against Black citizens, while in two, officers most commonly
used force against White citizens. On average, Austin featured the least experienced officers at
UOF events, while injuries occurred to officers at a roughly equitable rate, with Baltimore
reporting an elevated rate of injuries.
In considering correlation between variables, Table 2 suggests that the available variables
featured little relationship. The most notable correlation coefficient was between the motivation
for UOF reported by officers, and the UOF at an arrest (r=-0.390, p=<0.01). The only other
coefficients worthy of note described the correlation between the motivation for UOF and the
policing jurisdiction (r=0.240, p<0.01), and officer tenure and the policing jurisdiction (r=0.210,
p<0.01). These findings suggest that the likelihood of collinearity influencing subsequent
modelling was low.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Random Forest and Logistic Regression
The random forest was computed alongside a logistic regression for comparison. These
models attempted to predict whether patrol officers would draw, but not discharge, their firearms
at a UOF incident. As suggested by Figure 1, both the random forest and the logistic regression
featured success in predicting this outcome, with the random forest (AUROC = 0.7662)
marginally outperforming the logistic regression (AUROC = 0.7451). An AUROC of greater
than 0.7 is considered to represent a noteworthy prediction rate (Grogger et al, 2021), in this
circumstance each model met this criterion.
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[FIGURE 1 HERE]
The difference between the area under the ROC curve for these models was statistically
significant (p<0.01). However, while the difference between modelling approaches was
statistically significant, to fully explore the findings we report the outcomes of both modeling
procedures.
A confusion matrix was produced to consider the distribution of correct, and incorrect
decisions made by the random forest (see Table 3). Aggregate misclassification of UOF incidents
in the test-set was 10.47%, which closely adhered to the out-of-bag estimate of error on the
training sample (11.07%). The model featured substantial success at predicting incidents in
which officers would not draw their firearms, while featuring less success predicting instances in
which they would.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
The random forest suggested that the relative experience level of officers was strongly
associated with likelihood of drawing and pointing firearms as a means of control. Table 4
details the relative importance of each variable in this model, with officer tenure demonstrating
the strongest association, notably outperforming other variables. The jurisdiction in which the
incident occurred was also important, suggesting differences in likelihood of officers drawing
and pointing firearms between departments. While the motivation for the UOF reported by
officers, citizen race and the service type engaged in by officers held some association with
likelihood of drawing firearms, the remaining variables did not feature notable association.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
The findings of the logistic regression, computed using the same data and structure as the
random forest, largely supported the findings of the random forest (see Table 5). As was
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reflected in the summary statistics, officers in Baltimore, Dallas, and Portland appeared more
likely to draw firearms than those in Austin. Firearms were likely to be drawn when serving
warrants, or in response to incidents to which officers were dispatched, rather than incidents that
they observed. Officers were significantly more likely to draw firearms on male citizens than
female, and on Hispanic and Asian citizens than White citizens. However, officers were no more
or less likely to draw firearms on Black citizens than White citizens during use of force
incidents.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
Partial Dependence and Interaction Effects
Partial dependence plots were employed to consider the interaction, at different points
within variables, with patrol officers drawing their firearm at UOF incidents. The variable
featuring the strongest interaction with this phenomenon was the tenure of officers, a variable
that represented the experience level of officers. Figure 2 suggests that drawing firearms was
associated with officers around six years into their career; however, it was not exclusively
associated with junior officers. Officers with around 20 years’ experience were also associated
with drawing firearms.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
Partial dependence plots were then produced to consider an interaction effect between
key variables, with the interaction effect referring to the simultaneous effect of two or more
independent variables on a dependent variable. These were particularly employed to consider the
interaction effect of (1) the motivation for the UOF and the jurisdiction, (2) the service type
undertaken at the time force was used and the jurisdiction, and (3) the race of a citizen subject to
UOF and the jurisdiction. The intention was to consider whether the motivation for UOF, or the

20

service type that officers were engaged in, influenced the decision to draw and point firearms as
a means of control, and whether this differed between policing jurisdictions. Figure 3 considered
the interaction effect of motivation for UOF and jurisdiction on drawing and pointing firearms.
In all jurisdictions, citizens refusing to comply with officer directions was the motivation most
associated with officers drawing firearms. Figure 4 considered the interaction effect of the
service type officers were engaged in prior to the UOF, and the jurisdiction of officers, on the
likelihood of officers drawing firearms. In the majority of jurisdictions being dispatched to an
incident was most associated with drawing firearms, with the exception of Dallas, in which
observing an incident was most associated with drawing firearms.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
A partial dependence plot was computed to consider the interaction effect between the
motivation for UOF, the service type engaged in, and the likelihood of drawing firearms. Figure
5 suggested drawing firearms was most associated with officers being dispatched to an incident,
except when the intention was to make an arrest, where the incident was most likely observed by
officers.

[FIGURE 5 HERE]
Finally, a partial dependence plot was computed for the interaction effect between the
race of citizens, the policing jurisdiction, and the likelihood of officers drawing their firearms.
Figure 6 suggests that in two jurisdictions, Baltimore and Dallas, Black citizens were most likely
to have firearms drawn on them by officers. However, in Austin and Portland, White citizens
were most likely to have firearms drawn on them by officers.
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[FIGURE 6 HERE]
Discussion
Pointing a firearm at a person is a significant use of police authority – and unfortunately,
one that is less reliably tracked across agencies and far less empirically scrutinized than when
officers discharge their firearms (see, e.g., Garner et al., 2018, Table 4; VerBruggen, 2022). Prior
work concerned with this behavior has primarily considered the association between suspect and
officer characteristics, alongside situational variables, and whether they influenced the decision
to draw but not discharge a firearm at UOF events (Ridell & Worrall, 2021; Worrall et al., 2021).
Our findings suggest that there may be a complex interplay of situational and characteristic
features that relate to the likelihood of officers drawing firearms, and pivotally, there may be
jurisdictional differences.
In New Orleans, Riddell and Worrall (2021) found that citizen race was not a significant
predictor of firearms displays in incident-level analyses – instead, situational characteristics were
more important. Meanwhile, in Dallas, Worrall and colleagues (2021) found that Black suspects
were significantly less likely than White suspects to have guns drawn on them during UOF
incidents, but the difference was not statistically significant when restricted to the subset of UOF
incidents involving an arrest. In the present study, we observed that situational variables were
more important in model accuracy than race, but we also find that the extent to which race was
associated with drawing firearms varied across jurisdictions. For example, Figure 6 showed that
in some jurisdictions, drawing firearms was most associated with Black citizens, while in others
it was more associated with White citizens. These findings demonstrate the nuance in analyzing
UOF incidents between jurisdictions, and the importance of benchmarking findings with other
research and other agencies.
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In comparing findings, the rate at which officers drew their firearms in different
jurisdictions differed considerably. Riddell and Worrall (2021) reported that almost half of UOF
incidents in New Orleans between 2016 and 2019 resulted in a firearm being drawn. In contrast,
Stansfield and colleagues (2021) reported that in New Jersey between 2012 and 2016, only 1,425
out of more than 70,000, or 0.02% of UOF incidents resulted in officers drawing or discharging
their firearms. This discrepancy in rates of drawing firearms between jurisdictions should raise
concerns about generalizing from single-site UOF studies.
Priming the decision to draw firearms
The findings from interaction effects suggested that a priming effect may be present in
the decision to draw firearms at a UOF event. Priming is a phenomenon in which exposure to an
initial stimulus unconsciously influences a response to a subsequent stimulus (Bargh et al., 1996;
Shanks et al., 2013). Here, Figure 4 suggested that firearms displays were most likely in response
to a call for service from dispatch. Logistic regression findings supported this effect, also noting
an association between drawing firearms and the service of warrants. Both of these are duties in
which an officer is exposed to stimulus, either from dispatch or content relating to the warrant,
before a gap in time prior to the UOF incident. We contrast this with instances where, for
example, and officer observed an offense and responded immediately. At UOF incidents such as
these, drawing firearms was less likely.
Taylor (2019) employed an experimental methodology to test the likelihood that officers
would engage in deadly UOF, depending on the type of information provided to them by
dispatch when called out to an incident. This research intended to consider whether officers were
primed by the information provided to them prior to the incident, with a significant increase in
fatal shootings associated with incidents in which erroneous information was provided by
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dispatch (Taylor, 2019). The present findings suggest that officers who were dispatched to
incidents, and those that were serving a warrant, were more likely to draw their firearms at UOF
incidents. We suggest that a similar priming effect, to that identified by Taylor (2019), may be
operating here. Officers who experienced a delay between the call out and arriving at an incident,
either from dispatch or from duties relating to serving a warrant, held a greater association with
drawing firearms, when compared with officers that observed and responded to an incident
immediately. While we suggest that the effect observed in the present study may be, at least in
part, attributable to priming, this is an under-studied phenomenon in policing. The influence of
priming on perceived risk in use of force scenarios requires greater consideration, and may be an
important area for future research.
The generalizability of single site studies
Findings from both summary statistics (Table 1) and the logistic regression (Table 5)
demonstrated the notable difference in the rate at which officers drew their firearms. Officers in
Austin drew their firearms least, with officers in Baltimore, Dallas, and Portland drawing
firearms at least three times as frequently, a finding that was also reflected in the estimated odds
of an officer drawing their firearm in each jurisdiction. Further, the differences in types of
incidents that resulted in police using force, between jurisdictions, appeared noteworthy. This
was reflected in the service type engaged in at time of UOF and the reported motivations for
UOF.
These findings suggest that there may be some concerns relating to the generalizability of
single site studies on firearms displays. The considerable disparity between the rate of displaying
firearms between jurisdictions in our study reinforces the notion that caution should be exercised
in suggesting generalized policy change from analyses that consider only one jurisdiction.
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Although we cannot comment on the discharge of firearms using these data, the data used in this
research, particularly when compared with other research on the same subject matter, suggest
that single site studies may not provide sufficient context to generalize findings.
Generalizability is not only important to consider in prediction studies. Among studies
employing network analytics, there is emerging evidence of the social transmission of firearms
use among peer groups of officers. Pivotally, this research does not always point to the same
effect between jurisdictions. For example, Ouellet and colleagues (2022), analyzing data from
New Jersey, suggested that officers with greater exposure to colleagues that have a history of
discharging their firearm were less likely to discharge their own. However, in a similar study
using data from Chicago, Zhao and Papachristos (2020) found that officers located in brokerage
positions in a network, a position in between other officers, or groupings of officers, were more
likely to discharge their firearm. While the body of research employing network analytics to
firearms use by police is emerging, comparing findings between jurisdictions also appears
important.
Implications
This research features implications in both applied and research domains. Initially, it
appears that the officers associated with drawing firearms were not necessarily those expected.
For example, the tenure of officers was an important predictor, but it was not only junior officers
that were associated with drawing firearms – this effect peaked again among later-career officers.
There were also implications for the duties undertaken by officers. In particular, duties relating to
the service of a warrant, or when dispatched to an incident, featured an elevated likelihood of
drawing firearms. The implications of these findings relate to the way in which we view settings
in which officers exercise force of this type. It is more likely that officers would draw firearms at
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events in which there was a temporal gap between being notified of the duties, and the incident.
While we have suggested that this may be attributable to a priming effect, given that officers
observing an incident did not demonstrate a similar response, we cannot rule out observed
incidents featuring less inherent risk for police – certainly it is possible that warrant service
duties feature greater risk. Although there is some way to go before identifying causation in this
effect, if it is indeed attributable to a priming effect, there are important implications for the ways
that information is distributed to officers, and the methods of engagement in response to dispatch
call-outs and warrant service duties (Simpson, 2021; Simpson & Orosco, 2021).
While we have already discussed the difficulty generalizing single-site studies, the
implications of this finding bears note for research, and the extent to which findings may be used
to inform policy or practice. In this study, we analyze four policing agencies, and within those
four agencies there is some meaningful variation in the situational, motivational, and
characteristic traits of UOF incidents. Whether this is a function of the jurisdictional context, or
the training or culture of the individual agencies (Ingram et al., 2018), we cannot be certain.
However, it is clear that the decision of an officer to draw their firearm is a complex one, subject
to considerable influence from situational factors alongside individual characteristics. The
variation in rates at which officers draw their firearms across jurisdictions means researchers
should be hesitant in generalizing their conclusions or suggesting that their findings be drawn
into policy or practice beyond the jurisdiction that they are analyzing. Research focusing on
officers drawing, but not discharging their firearms is relatively limited. This knowledge area,
alongside UOF more broadly, may benefit from multi-site studies to more closely consider the
generalizability of findings.
Limitations
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Data entry is an important feature of the policing environment, typically performed as a
non-priority by time-poor staff. Given the primary intention of this data was not research, but
rather an administrative process by each of these agencies, this is considered to be naturally
occurring data (Lester et al, 2017). While we consulted the policy documents for when firearms
should be drawn and pointed at civilians, and the reporting requirements for this use of force
type to ensure similarity, there were also some minor differences. It is possible that the marginal
differences in reporting requirements for officers that observed use of force incidents may have
impacted upon reported rates of use of force in these data. For example, while the reported rate
of use of force at warrant duties was low, it differed between agencies. The similarities in the
policy statements of these agencies does not ultimately guarantee similar data quality, or that the
same incidents will be captured between agencies; there may still be differences in officers
reporting, or quality of administrative data entry. Naturally occurring data commonly features
flaws, such as missing data and inaccuracy of input. While we attempt to mitigate this limitation
through removing records that were missing data, it remains possible that the quality of the data
varied between these four agencies.
These data represent a large volume of records for analysis, however there are almost
certainly unreported instances of UOF. Data here does not include instances that involved minor
acts of force. Analytically, this is a within groups analysis, meaning findings should be applied to
instances of UOF only, and should not be generalized to all police interactions with citizens.
Indeed, it is important to note we cannot rule out the possibility of collider bias, whereby
sampling on UOF incidents blocked out any biases that might have influenced officers’ decisions
to stop and/or use force on citizens (Knox et al., 2020; Neil & Winship, 2019). In other words,
although we observed that Black citizens were no more or less likely than White citizens to have
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guns drawn on them during UOF incidents, we cannot say with certainty that Black people are
equally likely overall to have an officer draw a gun on them, especially given that studies
routinely show police are more likely to stop racial minorities in the first place (Epp et al., 2014;
Gelman et al., 2007; Pierson et al., 2020). Thus, one opportunity for future research in this area is
to employ a matched sample of citizen interactions with police that did not result in a UOF.
Unfortunately, the present research could not consider the prevalence of UOF among all police
interactions.
As previously mentioned, collinearity is a risk among administrative and procedural
datasets. In particular, collinear variables are an important risk in random forest modelling. Highly
correlated variables increase the possibility that they may artificially inflate the rate of
classification accuracy of a given model. However, bootstrap aggregation, or bagging, in the
random forest mitigates the likelihood that accuracy of models presented here are impacted upon
by collinear variables, although individual variable importance may be marginally impacted
(Cubitt et al., 2020). To identify the likelihood of this influence, we computed and presented a
correlation matrix as Table 2. This matrix did not suggest that there was sufficient correlation
between variables to influence variable importance, in particular it did not reveal variable
correlation that may overcome the bagging technique. While it was important to note this as a
limitation, there was no meaningful evidence of collinearity among these data. Further, the
confusion matrix for the random forest closely adhered to the out-of-bag error estimate on the
training set, and the area under the ROC curve suggesting that collinearity was not a noteworthy
aspect of this analysis.
Finally, it is noteworthy that certain variables performed differently in the logistic
regression analysis than they did in the random forest. For example, in the logistic regression the
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officer tenure variable suggested that longer tenure was associated with decreased odds of an
officer drawing their firearm. However, while the partial dependence plot in Figure 2 suggested a
similar aggregate effect as the logistic regression, there were certain points at which the association
with drawing and pointing firearms increased. In this instance the findings are explainable, as the
logistic regression describes the aggregate effect, while the partial dependence plot describes the
effect at each point within officer tenure. However, it is important to note that there is nothing
preventing a variable with a small linear effect size, as estimated in a logistic regression, from
featuring high importance in a random forest model. The random forest relies on the way covariates
interact to discriminate between the binary outcome variable, it then describes the differential
importance of the covariates in undertaking this task. As a result, while this is not entirely the case
here, it is possible that the logistic regression, and the random forest take different paths to predict
the outcome variable, and may therefore produce divergent results.
Conclusion
We close by emphasizing that this sort of research is only possible when agencies are
transparent with their data. We also implore the thousands of agencies that do not currently
require officers to document when they point their firearms at citizens (Brooks, 2020) to begin
doing so immediately. Not only does such a reporting requirement appear to be associated with a
reduction in police shootings (Jennings & Rubado, 2017) without jeopardizing officer safety
(Shjarback et al., 2021), it also enables agencies and researchers to better review and understand
“near misses” – those instances in which officers averted the use of deadly force. But even in the
absence of these two justifications, there is a third reason to do so: it is the morally appropriate
thing for police in a democratic society to do. We hope that our work will spark additional
research on this specific use of police coercion.
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Table 1. Characteristics of use of force incidents by patrol officers between 1 January 2017 and 31
December 2019 among 4 Police Departments.
Agency
Austin
10,307

Baltimore
7,589

Dallas
7,265

Portland
4,033

3.75

14.88

16.48

11.70

25.17

50.62

60.67

20.42

72.24

45.21

34.10

79.47

Serving a warrant

0.39

3.94

0.67

0.00

Off duty

0.00

0.23

2.63

0.11

Other

2.20

0.00

1.93

0.00

64.35

17.68

52.48

13.92

Citizen failed to comply

27.77

67.64

26.90

67.24

Defense of self or others

6.70

14.68

20.62

18.84

Other

1.18

0.00

0.00

0.02

64.29

68.96

85.33

72.78

Male

74.99

82.87

82.55

76.23

Female

25.01

17.13

17.45

23.77

Asian

0.59

0.17

0.55

2.84

Black

20.85

84.87

54.89

29.03

Hispanic

32.13

1.37

21.06

8.78

0.11

0.01

0.29

1.34

45.94

6.90

22.11

58.01

0.38

4.71

1.10

0.00

Average officer tenure (years)

5.24

6.36

7.32

9.43

Officer injured (%)

9.52

18.80

9.24

5.08

Complete records (n)
Situational characteristics
Drew firearm (%)
Service type at time of use of force
(%)
Observed incident
Dispatched to incident

Reported motivation for use of force
(%)
Making an arrest

UOF that resulted in an arrest (%)
Citizen characteristics
Citizen gender

Citizen race

Indigenous American
White
Unknown
Officer characteristics
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Table 2. Correlation matrix for data on use of force incidents by patrol officers
Draw and
point firearm

.059**

-.026**

-.059**

-.091**

.018*

-.077**

.001

.120**

Motivation

.046**

-.049**

.022**

.094**

.025**

-.390**

.240**

Service type

.134**

.069**

.032**

-.020**

-.160**

.079**

Citizen race

.068**

-.012**

-.065**

-.072**

-.055**

Citizen
gender

.006

-.034**

-.086**

.005**

Officer
tenure

.007

.006

.210**

Officer
injured

.053**

-.047**

Arrest

.160**

Police
jurisdiction
*<0.05, **<0.01
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Table 3. Confusion matrix for patrol officers drawing but not discharging firearms in the test set
Predicted
Predicted
Misclassification
Total
negative
positive
rate
True negative
7,527
649
8,176
7.95%
True positive
268
313
581
46.13%
Total
7,795
962
8,757
Misclassification rate
3.56%
67.46%
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Table 4. Variable importance for random forest trained on officers
drawing their firearms.
Variable
Mean Decrease Gini
Officer tenure

50.74

Motivation for use of force

20.56

Policing jurisdiction

9.45

Citizen race

6.08

Service type at use of force incident

4.41

Arrest during use of force incident

3.36

Officer injured

2.75

Citizen gender

2.65
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Table 5. Logistic regression estimates and odds ratios
Variable
Log-odds
Service type at use of force incident
Observed incident (ref.)
Dispatched to incident
.094
Off duty
-.746
Warrant service
-.608
Other
-.006
Motivation for use of force
Refused to comply (ref.)
Make an arrest
1.288
Defense of self or others
1.559
Other
1.247
Arrest during use of force incident
No (ref.)
Yes
-.427
Citizen gender
Female (ref.)
Male
.903
Citizen race
White (ref.)
Asian
.454
Black
.033
Hispanic
.311
Indigenous American
-.096
Unknown
.021
Officer tenure
-.008
Officer injured
No (ref.)
Yes
-1.089
Policing jurisdiction
Baltimore (ref.)
Austin
-2.033
Dallas
-0.341
Portland
-0.332

SE

OR

.043
.277
.145
.201

1.098*
.047**
1.837**
.993

.055
.053
.375

3.624**
4.757**
3.478**

.051

.652**

.062

2.468**

0.205
.054
.065
.471
.142
.003

1.574*
1.033
1.364**
.382*
1.021
.991*

.092

.336**

.076
.056
.072

0.131**
0.711**
0.717**

NOTE: Categorical variables employ the first level as the reference variable for analysis. The findings for each
subsequent category within that variable are respective to the baseline of the first variable.
*<0.05, **<0.01
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Figure 1. Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve random forest (black) and logistic regression (red) for
officers drawing, but not discharging their firearms at a use of force incident.
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Figure 2. Partial dependence plot for officer tenure and likelihood of drawing firearms as a means of
control at use of force incidents
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Figure 3. Partial dependence plot for the interaction effect between officer motivation, and the jurisdiction of officers, and likelihood of drawing
firearms as a means of control at use of force incidents.
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Figure 4. Partial dependence plot for the interaction effect between service type, and the jurisdiction of officers, and likelihood of drawing firearms
as a means of control at use of force incidents.
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Figure 5. Partial dependence plot for the interaction effect between officer motivation, and service type, and likelihood of drawing firearms as a
means of control at use of force incidents
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Figure 6. Partial dependence plot for the interaction effect between race of the citizen, and jurisdiction, and likelihood of drawing firearms as a
means of control at use of force incidents

